PARTS 1–3

Artificial Intelligence in Cybersecurity

Machine learning for threat detection:
foundations, evaluation and limits

When does an AI output justify action?



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Kristiansand · HU 024

About the lecturer



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> How can we understand a learned decision and use it responsibly?

Profile and portrait: per-arne.no · University of Agder.

My industry experience

PREVIOUS EMPLOYER

NTT Security

Managed security services

PREVIOUS EMPLOYER


Telenor Cyberdefence

Cybersecurity services for organisations

> From security practice to a recurring teaching question:
> **What evidence justifies the next action?**

Organisations: NTT Security · Telenor Cyberdefence.

Research I work on



CaiRL Research Toolkit

Build, run and compare **reinforcement-learning experiments**.

Can we reproduce and trust the comparison?



Tsetlin RL Experiments

Explore **interpretable learning** and the behaviour of learning agents.

Can we inspect why the agent chose an action?

The same questions matter for security: what did we measure, and what justifies an action?

Project descriptions and illustrations: per-arne.no.

A practical tool I built



Public landing page, November 2026

POENGTAVLA.NO

From an idea to a usable interface

A public web project alongside the research toolkit and learning experiments.

Teaching connection: make a system's purpose and the next action easy to understand.

Which tools do you use?

Show of hands, one card at a time. Each one returns later today.

Email filter

Spam and phishing filtering

Scores every incoming message.

Today: slides 36–44

EDR

Endpoint Detection and Response

Watches processes and files on each device.

Today: slides 21–22 and 45

SIEM

Security Information and Event Management

Gathers events into one alert queue.

Today: slides 42–43

UEBA

User and Entity Behavior Analytics

Learns each user's and host's normal.

Today: slides 19 and 46

LLM

Large language model in security work

Drafts, summarises and suggests actions.

Today: slides 57–58

HOW WE'LL WORK

- Interrupt with questions.
- Bring your operational experience.
- Slides and references follow after class.

Terminology: NIST CSRC Glossary, Endpoint Detection and Response and SIEM tool · IBM, User and Entity Behavior Analytics [industry].

When does an AI output justify action?

AI *for* security

1. Machine-learning foundations
2. Detection and its evaluation
3. Methodological pitfalls
4. LLMs and AI-enabled threats

Security *of* AI

The AI system itself becomes the asset under attack.

QUESTION 1 · INTERPRET THE OUTPUT

What does a score of 0.73, or an LLM's draft, actually tell us about this case?

QUESTION 2 · JUSTIFY THE DECISION

Which independent check, and whose approval, must come before we block, isolate or report?

What you will be able to do

Explain

How representation shapes a detector.

EXAMPLE

A 02:14 sign-in: unusual, not proof.

Calculate

Precision, alert load and thresholds.

$$\text{precision} = \frac{90}{90 + 10} = 90\%$$

EXAMPLE

A mail filter: 100 alerts, 90 real.

Critique

Judge an evaluation; propose a better one.



EXAMPLE CLAIM

“99.8% accuracy”: tested on future data?

Assess

Weigh LLM value, risks and controls.

EXAMPLE

After a 02:14 sign-in, an LLM drafts “cut laptop W17 off the network”: which evidence first?

Today in three parts

PART 1

How does a model learn from data?

Paradigms · pipeline · representation

Break

PART 2

Is the detector useful?

How many alerts are real? Can analysts keep up?

Break


PART 3

Where do evaluations and AI tools mislead?

Pitfalls, drift and LLMs

Optional questions

Three ways AI meets security



REAL CASE · HUGGING FACE, JULY 2026


Evaluation agents carried out an unauthorised intrusion into an AI platform; Hugging Face reports using AI to **detect and analyse it**. One incident touches all three relationships.

Framing (ours): Taddeo et al. (2019) · NIST AI 100-2e2025 · Brundage et al. (2018) · NCSC (2024) [government]. Case: Hugging Face (16 July 2026) [industry] · METR / Redwood (26 August 2026).

Why machine learning in security?

- Scale
- Generalise
- Unequal costs
- **Adversarial**

Attackers adapt: a rewritten variant slips below the line.



Evasion: the next email, rewritten, scores below 0.50 and is missed.

Analyst queue
100 alerts
to review



90
attacks

10 false alerts
still cost
analyst time

Sommer & Paxson (2010) · Axelsson (2000) · Biggio & Roli (2018)

Part 1 · Machine-learning foundations

How does a model learn from data?

Pipeline focus: data collection · labelling · representation · training

What is machine learning?

Learn from **experience (E)** to improve a **task (T)**, judged by **performance (P)**.

Phishing filter

Classification

`Your mailbox expires today.`

learned model

phishing → review

- **T** Phishing or legitimate?
- **E** 1,000 labelled emails, user reports
- **P** detection rate at fixed false alarms

Malware classifier

Classification

invoice_7731.pdf.exe
4D 5A 90 00 03 00 …

CreateRemoteThread
packed section
section entropy 7.6


learned patterns

malicious → sandbox

- **T** Malicious or benign?
- **E** labelled files from earlier months
- **P** detection on later files

Sign-in anomaly detector

Anomaly detection



unusual → review

- **T** Is this sign-in unusual for this user?
- **E** last 14 days of sign-ins, no labels
- **P** confirmed incidents per alert

Before trusting a detector, name its T, E and P. Unusual is not malicious: the **02:14** sign-in goes to review.

Task / experience / performance: Mitchell (1997)

One email, a rule and a model

Is this email phishing?

From “Service desk” <it-desk@exampIe.com>
Your mailbox expires today.
Re-enter your password to keep your mailbox:
mail.example.com target: mail.exampIe.com/reset

link text `mail.examp1e.com`
target `mail.exampIe.com`

Features: link mismatch **0.8** · credential pressure **0.7**

Rule path · an analyst writes the condition

- [x] link text ≠ link target
- [x] **AND** asks for credentials

review

Model path · weights fitted from labelled emails

$$z = 2(0.8) + 2(0.7) - 2 = 1.0$$

$$\sigma(z) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-z}} = 0.73$$

0.73
≥ 0.50 → review

σ squeezes any number into 0–1

score




> Same input; different origin of the decision. Deployed systems often combine both.

Zinkevich (n.d.), Rules of ML #3 (prefer ML to a complex heuristic), #7 (turn heuristics into features)


A model is a learned rule

Can a model be read as a rule?

Rule path · written by an analyst



Learned rule · a one-neuron network



Same decision for this email: an analyst wrote the left rule; labelled emails set the right one's weights. A network is a learned rule; more neurons fit more complex rules. Learned does not mean right: **test both**.

One neuron and universal approximation: Goodfellow et al. (2016) §6.4.1 · email model and rule from "One email, a rule and a model"

Rules or models? Test both

Which approach should guard the mailbox?

Trait	Hand-written rule	Learned model	Example
Decision logic	analyst writes **AND**	fitted w, b	phishing email: **review**
Coverage	**silent** no password request	**0.60** **review**	“Review your mailbox settings” same link, no password request
Data & labels	nothing to fit	1,000 labels	analysts label, late
Maintenance	edit the rule	retrain	re-test both on later mail


The model caught the variant the rule missed, but may flag more good mail. Only **next month’s mail** decides.

Four sources of training signal

What supplies the training signal?


Supervised
labels from outside the data

labelled sign-ins → classify




Unsupervised
no labels: groups or a baseline

sign-ins → groups




Self-supervised
target hidden in the data

auth log → predict masked field



Reinforcement
rewards from actions


cyber range → best move



Reinforcement: rewards after actions. Four training signals: labels, structure, hidden fields, rewards.

Supervised learning

Is the 02:14 sign-in an attack?




labels so far **20**

A line is fitted to the labels: attacks on one side, benign sign-ins on the other. The score shows which side the 02:14 sign-in falls on.

a prediction, not a confirmed incident


- unlabelled
- benign label
- attack label
- 02:14 sign-in
- earlier fit

02:14 sign-in score s



Twenty labels: the line settles; the 02:14 sign-in scores **0.58**, still attack side. A prediction, not a confirmed incident.

Unsupervised learning



J = total squared distance to the group centres **= 0.279**

Stops when no sign-in changes group.

iteration **4** ● group 1 ■ group 2 ▲ group 3

Which group is an attack? **Clustering cannot say.**


distance to nearest centre **0.31** > 0.14, the farthest training sign-in

unusual → review


Anomaly score **0.31**, beyond every training sign-in (dashed rings): review it; unusual is not malicious.

Lloyd (1982) · Chandola et al. (2009), anomaly detection survey · Google · Introduction to ML · ML playground

Self-supervised learning



Predicted hidden field dashed: before the update



First guess: **blocked 30%**.


Answer was blocked, so error **1.20**

One nudge: blocked **50%**.

Error falls to **0.69**. Repeat on millions of lines.

> One learning step (a nudge to the scores): blocked becomes the top guess; the error falls from 1.20 to **0.69**.

Reinforcement learning



Value = best move's reward + 0.9 × next host's value (later rewards count a bit less)

−1 per move; the final move earns +10 instead · −10 monitored

arrows ›: best move

round 8: no change

Best route: 7 moves to the backup server, worth **0.63**

value at start **0.63**

Converged. The greedy path avoids both monitored servers: 7 moves, value **0.63**.

One sensor changes the route



Value = best move's reward + 0.9 × next host's value (later rewards count a bit less)

−1 per move; the final move earns +10 instead · −10 monitored

arrows ›: best move

round 10: settled

With the sensor: a 9-move detour, worth **-1.39**

value at start **0.63 → −1.39**


One EDR sensor: 9 moves, the start's value falls from 0.63 (7-move route) to **−1.39**. Change the rewards, change the moves it picks.

When does reinforcement learning fit?

> **Decision test:** do actions change future outcomes, and can you evaluate that feedback credibly?


Good fit

A red-team path in a **cyber range** (a practice network)



Start simpler

One email: a **classifier**



Moves change what comes next: RL can fit. One decision per email: start with a classifier.

Fit judgements: lecturer's, informed by McFadden et al. (2026), USENIX Security · Microsoft CyberBattleSim

Quick check · which paradigm?

Decide for each task before the answer appears. Call out your answer.

Task	Paradigm
Rank alerts using analysts' past decisions (dismissed or escalated)	**Supervised**
Group 2,000 new phishing-email variants into unnamed campaigns	**Unsupervised · clustering**
Flag a service account that departs from its own history	**Unsupervised · anomaly detection**
First learn from raw auth logs, then train on 300 labelled incidents	**Self-supervised, then supervised**
Choose a red-team agent's next host in a cyber range	**Reinforcement**

Libraries do the maths

Do you have to write the maths yourself?

Supervised
scikit-learn
as on ‘Supervised learning’

```
from sklearn.linear_model import LogisticRegression
model = LogisticRegression().fit(X, y)
model.predict_proba(signin)
```

Unsupervised
scikit-learn
as on ‘Unsupervised learning’

```
from sklearn.cluster import KMeans
groups = KMeans(n_clusters=3).fit_predict(signins)
```

Self-supervised
Hugging Face · uses a ready model
general English, not our logs

```
from transformers import pipeline
fill = pipeline("fill-mask", model="bert-base-uncased")
fill("user=staff-0388 dev=W22 loc=new result=[MASK]")
```

Reinforcement
Stable-Baselines3
not the method on slide 21


```
from stable_baselines3 import PPO
agent = PPO("MlpPolicy", env).learn(total_timesteps=10_000)
```

> The library does the maths. **Your job:** the data, the labels, the features and the evaluation.

Documentation: scikit-learn · Hugging Face Transformers [industry] · Stable-Baselines3

From reported email to alert

How does a reported email become an alert?




> Each stage is a design decision, and each can fail or be attacked.

Arp et al. (2022), pipeline stages and pitfalls · full seven-stage checklist in the field guide

A model sees only what we encode

Predict: what can an attacker do to a text-only phishing detector?




What is not represented cannot be detected; what is represented can be manipulated.

> Same lure, new representation: **0.12** as text only, **0.73** once decoded.

Three model families, one file


`invoice_7731.pdf.exe` | imports `CreateRemoteThread` · packed section · entropy 7.6 / 8

Linear · weighted clues



Limit · interactions must be hand-built.

Decision tree · conditions



Limit · cannot extrapolate beyond data.

Neural · learned features



Limit · more data, more evaluation.

> Neural: learn the representation from raw bytes. **Every family** can learn shortcuts and needs held-out evaluation.

Grinsztajn et al. (2022) · Raff et al. (2018) · Hastie et al. (2009) §9.2, §10 · Arp et al. (2022)

How a model learns

How does a model find its weights?




> Guess, measure, nudge, repeat. That loop is **training**; the next slide shows it on the 48 sign-ins.


Goodfellow et al. (2016) §4.3 (gradient-based optimisation).

Learning is optimisation

Sign-in classifier · 48 labelled sign-ins

update **200** · loss (how wrong, on average) **0.141** · misclassified **0**






Update 200: loss 0.141, 0 errors. Confidence on training data does not test unseen sign-ins.

Goodfellow et al. (2016) §4.3, §5.7.1, §7.3, §7.8 · Biggio et al. (2013).

Training, validation and test data

Which data may the model learn from?

● benign ✕ attack




> In security, **split by time**: train on the past, test on a later week, as deployment will.

Hastie et al. (2009) §7.2 (training, validation and test sets) · Pendlebury et al. (2019).

Validation catches overfitting


- **Training** fits
- **Validation** selects
- **Test** once, untouched

Degree = how flexible the curve is. Higher degree fits training data more closely.



Deploy on **validation** error, not training error.

Demo · fitting a score versus choosing a review threshold



Priority score: a ranking number, higher = review sooner (can go below 0) · x: login burst (normalised) · dots: labelled alerts · amber line: review threshold · grey bands: outside the training range

ALERT-PRIORITY SCORE · PROJECTOR · 8 MINUTES

1. **Fit:** line, then small neural network.
2. **Check:** validation mean squared error (MSE).
3. **Decide:** freeze weights; change review threshold.

Open Lab 01 ↗

> **Predict:** which changes the fitted curve: training or moving the threshold?

Part 2 · Detection and its evaluation

Is the detector useful?

Pipeline focus: evaluation

Misuse or anomaly?

network flow workstation `ws-114` → `203.0.113.45` · **`95 MB/min`** · `09:05`

Misuse detection — rules or a supervised classifier

Does it match known malicious behaviour?


- ⊖ known exfiltration signature: **none**
- ⊖ destination on threat feed: **no**

no match

⚠ coverage depends on known evidence

Anomaly detection — statistics or a one-class model

Is it unusual for ws-114?



very unusual
85 above its normal 10
≈ 70 × its usual spread


⚠ a backup is also unusual

Neither proves intent. Check the sending process, the destination and the job schedule.

Two questions, two answers. **Either question can use rules or a learned model.**

Denning (1987): anomaly model · Kumar & Spafford (1994): misuse model · Sommer & Paxson (2010)

Count decisions before choosing a metric



Vote: which costs more, missed phishing (FN) or a quarantined invoice (FP)?


No universal answer: impact and workflow set the cost.

The $FN = 10$ misses raised no alert: they were delivered, unseen by the analyst.

Fawcett (2006) · Arp et al. (2022): wrong performance measure.

Precision · how many alerts are real?

Mail filter · 1,000 emails, 100 phishing



Denominator: all 100 alerts

$$\text{Precision} = \frac{TP}{TP + FP}$$

$$= \frac{90}{90 + 10} = \mathbf{90\%}$$

☐ **10** of the 100 alerts are false

False discovery rate:


$\text{FDR} = 1 - \text{precision} = 10\%$

Precision 90%: each hollow square is a review spent on legitimate mail.

FDR = false discovery rate (1 − precision) · Fawcett (2006) · metric formula reference, including accuracy and F1.

How many attacks are caught?

Mail filter · 1,000 emails, 100 phishing



Recall · phishing caught

$$\frac{TP}{TP+FN} = \frac{90}{100}$$ **90%**

False-positive rate (FPR)

$$\frac{FP}{FP+TN} = \frac{10}{900}$$ **1.1%**

False alerts, as on Precision


10 of 100 alerts **10%**

The same **10** false alerts: **1.1%** of legitimate mail, but **10%** of the alerts.

Fawcett (2006)

What does an ROC curve show?

One day: 1,000,000 events · 100 attacks



ROC = receiver operating characteristic
Up: more attacks caught. Left: fewer false alerts.

Threshold	Attacks caught	False alerts per day	Alerts that are real
1.0	97.7%	≈ 158,639	0.06%
3.09	46.4%	**≈ 1,000**	4.4%


Strict threshold: about **1,000** false alerts, and only about **4 in 100** alerts are real. AUC (area under the curve, one grade for all thresholds) 0.98 hides this.


AUC = area under the curve · scores $\mathcal{N}(0,1)$ vs $\mathcal{N}(3,1)$ · Fawcett (2006) · McClish (1989) · Davis & Goadrich (2006)

Rare attacks, mostly false alerts

A good detector: catches 99% of attacks, flags 1% of normal events by mistake

All 10,098 alerts land in one queue: only about 1 in 100 is real.






$$\text{alerts that are real} = \frac{99}{99 + 9{,}999} \approx 1\%$$

Axelsson (2000) ACM TISSEC 3(3) · Gigerenzer & Hoffrage (1995) Psychological Review 102(4) · Arp et al. (2022): base-rate fallacy.

Live demo · from too many alerts to a workable queue

Model B separates attacks far better than the demo's first model (A): under 200 alerts, 97 of 100 caught.



Model B · **100** attacks a day · catches 97.0%

Alerts/day	Real alerts	Attacks missed
129	**75.2%**	**3**
within capacity	of all alerts	of 100

Analyst queue: **97 real** + 32 false


0 — analysts can check 200 a day — 400

Click	Rate	Model	t	Alerts	Precision	Missed
Start	10%	A	0.50	139,673	69.2%	3,338
1	0.01%	A	0.50	47,883	0.2%	3
2	0.01%	A	0.74	166	25.9%	57
▸ 3	**0.01%**	**B**	**0.70**	**129**	**75.2%**	**3**

Assumed: 1,000,000 events/day, capacity 200 alerts/day · Axelsson (2000) · Alahmadi et al. (2022)

Analysts cannot review everything

One analyst's shift (Lab 05) · 67 alerts, time to check only 50



checked today

not checked today

Real attacks checked, of 18

◆ real attack ☐ false alert

False alerts first (worst case)	**1**
Random order	**13**
Perfect ranking (upper bound)	**18**

A perfect ranking, impossible in practice, would check all **18**. A better ranking model moves real attacks up the queue.

Alahmadi et al. (2022) · Lab 05 shift, a noisier detector than model B: 18 real attacks + 49 false alerts = 67 alerts

Alert 1 · a reported email

A staff member reports this email. Phishing?

Inbox · as staff see it

SD **Service desk**
to me

Your mailbox expires today.

Act now: sign in immediatly and confirm your pasword within 24 hours.

mail.example.com

not our portal
→ **report and block**

Message source · what the client does not show

From: "Service desk" <it-desk@exampIe.com>

sender domain `exampIe.com` capital **I** · U+0049

our domain `examplе.com` lowercase **l** · U+006C

Authentication-Results: mx.example.com;
spf=**pass** ✓ dkim=**pass** ✓ dmarc=**pass** ✓
header.from=exampIe.com

} **authenticates exampIe.com, not intent**

link goes to
`mail.exampIe.com/reset`

≠

known portal
`mail.example.com`

> Verified by **identity, authentication and destination**, not prose. Next: did anyone open mail from this sender?

Sahami et al. (1998) · Heiding et al. (2024) [preprint] · `example.com` reserved: Eastlake & Panitz (1999), RFC 2606

Alert 2 · the attachment ran

ws-114 opened `invoice_7731.pdf.exe`. Malicious?


escalate for review

Static · before execution

file	`invoice_7731.pdf.exe` double extension
import	`CreateRemoteThread`
packed	yes
entropy	**7.6** of 8 bits/byte

Limit · packing hides features

Dynamic · inside a controlled sandbox



Limit · it may behave differently outside the sandbox

sender · lookalike domain, capital `I`
`it-desk@exampIe.com`

parent process (EDR)
the mail client on ws-114


same IP in the proxy log
outbound upload to `203.0.113.45`

> No single clue proves malware; **together** they justify escalation. Next: is ws-114 sending data?

Anderson & Roth (2018) [preprint] · Raff et al. (2018) · Aghakhani et al. (2020) · Lindorfer et al. (2011) · Zhu et al. (2020)

Alert 3 · the upload from ws-114

ws-114 uploads 95 MB/min to 203.0.113.45. Unusual?



workstation ws-114
normal 10 · spread 1.22
≈ 70 unusual

backup server
normal 97.5 · spread 9.54
0.26 normal


score = distance ÷ spread
band: score ≤ 3

> Unusual for ws-114, normal for a backup server. With alerts 1 and 2: **escalate; request isolation** from whoever may approve it.

Liu et al. (2008) · Mirsky et al. (2018) · McHugh (2000) · Engelen et al. (2021) · baselines from Lab 04

Explanations are leads, not proof

Why was this email flagged? · a fuller model with five clues



Urgent phrases +1.8: the cheapest for the attacker to remove

Check next: link target and gateway record

> Verify the link target and gateway record before acting: how much each clue added is **a lead to check**, not proof.

Is 99.9% accuracy good?

“99.9% accurate”

A vendor’s new network detector claims this. **Would you buy it?**

A detector that never alerts, on a day of 1,000,000 events with 100 attacks:

$$\text{accuracy} = \frac{999{,}900}{1{,}000{,}000} = 99.99\%$$

Higher than the vendor’s 99.9%, with **0 of 100** attacks caught.

Alert load at our base rate? **Whose data, when?** **Drift and adaptive attackers?**

Is the detector useful? Only if enough alerts are real for analysts to keep up.

Part 3 · Limits and new capabilities

Where do evaluations and AI tools mislead?

Pipeline focus: evaluation · deployment · monitoring

Four ways a score can mislead

A vendor reports “99.9% accurate”. Check four things before you trust it.

1 · DATA

Is the training data like ours?

Other networks or wrong labels mislead it.

Ask: who labelled the training data?

2 · DESIGN

Did the test leak into training?

Shared hosts or days make the test too easy.

Ask: were training and test kept apart?

3 · EVALUATION

Does the number count what matters?

Balanced test data hides our false alerts.

Ask: false alerts per day, for us?

4 · OPERATION


Will it still work here, later?

Traffic changes; attackers adapt.

Ask: tested on later traffic and attackers?

Arp et al. (2022), pitfalls P1–P10 found in 30 security papers. Full checklist.

Test on later data, not a random mix




A fair test copies real use: the detector only ever sees the past.

Pendlebury et al. (2019) TESSERACT, USENIX Security · Arp et al. (2022): data snooping.

Shortcuts look perfect in the lab

Vendor's phishing model scores 100% in the lab. What did it learn?



100% lab test, same data

In real use: **40 of 80** right **50%**

Real use: normal mail also comes from outside, phishing also from hacked staff accounts. ✗ = mistake: **50%** right.

Quick check · spot the pitfall (1/3)

A VENDOR CLAIMS THIS. WHAT IS WRONG?

“Our detector reaches 99.8% accuracy.”

99.8% of what? How many real attacks were in the test?

> **Wrong measure.** When attacks are rare, accuracy hides the false alerts. Ask: attacks caught, false alerts per day, share of attacks.

“We randomly split apps collected from 2012–2018.”

Was the test data newer than the training data?

> **Test leaked into training.** Newer apps land in training and older ones are tested, as with family K.

Arp et al. (2022). Pitfall key.

Quick check · spot the pitfall (2/3)

A VENDOR CLAIMS THIS. WHAT IS WRONG?

“We tuned on the test set and kept the best of 50 runs.”

Is the test still an unseen exam?

> **Test leaked into training.** The test was used to choose. Make choices on validation data; keep a fresh test.

“Our deep model beats a 2010 signature scanner.”

Is beating a 2010 tool impressive today?

> **Weak comparison.** Compare with today’s tools on the same data.

Arp et al. (2022). Pitfall key.

Quick check · spot the pitfall (3/3)

A VENDOR CLAIMS THIS. WHAT IS WRONG?

“Balanced test data gave 99% precision.”

Will 99% of alerts be real on our network?

> **Wrong share of attacks.** In the test half the events were attacks; on our network, 1 in 10,000.

Balanced test
1,000 attacks: 990 alerts · 1,000 benign: 10 alerts

$$\frac{990}{990 + 10} = 99\%$$

Our day: 1,000,000 events
100 attacks: 99 alerts · 999,900 benign: 9,999 alerts

$$\frac{99}{99 + 9{,}999} \approx 1\%$$

Same detector; only the share of attacks changed.


Arp et al. (2022) · Axelsson (2000). Pitfall key.

What changed after deployment?

Inputs change — covariate shift

One sign-in log field

after browser update



Visible without labels:
a check on the inputs spots it.
Effect on errors varies.

More attacks — prior shift


Alerts per 1,000,000 events

Before: 100 attacks — precision



≈ 1%

Phishing wave: 1,000 attacks




≈ 9%

true alerts false alerts

Ten times more attacks,
only **+8.7%** more alerts:
so check a sample of alerts.

Meaning changes — concept drift

QR-code emails that are phishing




Inputs can look unchanged;
only alerts that analysts check reveal it (Gama et al., 2014).

A check on inputs catches the first. The other two need analysts to **check a sample of alerts**.

Moreno-Torres et al. (2012) · Jordaney et al. (2017) · Gama et al. (2014) ACM Computing Surveys 46(4) · Axelsson (2000).

LLM output is a draft

The 02:14 sign-in again · a detector gives a score, an LLM writes text



> It writes what **sounds** right. Nothing has checked the draft yet: that is the next slide.

Bommasani et al. (2021) [preprint] · Ouyang et al. (2022)

Draft, then verify

Assistant draft · two claims, two checks

input · sign-in log + device inventory

`02:14 user=staff-0412 dev=W17 new_device=true`

`W17 · laptop · assigned to staff-0412`

LLM →

draft · generated

`New device for staff-0412`[C1]; ~~`isolate workstation W17`~~[C2].

C1 new device — enrolment record: **W17 enrolled 18:40 the previous evening** — ✓ **confirmed**

C2 isolate W17 — IT change record · HR roster: **planned laptop swap; user works nights** — ✕ **refuted**

Policy: isolation needs an authorised approver → **no automatic isolation**

> The draft summarised and proposed; **evidence and authority** decided.

Read the scope of vendor claims

AI companies report big security numbers. Check what each one actually counts.

Vendor · agent	What they report	What the number really shows
Anthropic · Mythos Preview	181 Firefox exploits	**kept secret: can't be checked**
OpenAI · Codex Security	10,561 serious findings	**possible bugs, not attacks**
Google · Big Sleep, CodeMender	20 bugs · 72 fixes	**checked by people**
Microsoft · Security Copilot	up to 6.5× true alerts per analyst minute	**one internal trial**
XBOW · AI pentester	#1 on HackerOne (bug bounties)	**130 of ~1,060 reports fixed**

All vendor-reported. Independent: UK AI Security Institute, Mythos solved 73% of expert hacking tasks.

Anthropic (7 April 2026) [industry] · CSA (8 March 2026) · Google DeepMind (2025) [industry] · TechCrunch (2025) [news] · Bono (2025) [preprint] · XBOW (2025) [industry] · UK AISI (13 April 2026) [government] · Epoch AI (11 June 2026)

Open-source tools you can run

Free tools you can download and try today.

LLM-BASED

Atlantis, Buttercup · AI finds and patches bugs

OSS-Fuzz-gen · AI writes crash-hunting tests

garak, PyRIT · test LLMs for weaknesses

LlamaFirewall · blocks unsafe agent actions

OTHER AI (NO LLM)

EMBER2024 · test set for malware detectors

Magika · detects a file's real type

ART · tests ML models against attacks

Kitsune · spots unusual network traffic

All open-source licences (GPL, AGPL, Apache, MIT)

> Mostly the authors' own results. **13** changed bytes fool Magika **90%** of the time.

DARPA (2025) [government] · Google (2024) [industry] · Derczynski et al. (2024) [preprint] · Lopez Munoz et al. (2024) [preprint] · Chennabasappa et al. (2025) [preprint] · Joyce et al. (2025) · Fratantonio et al. (2024) [preprint] · Nasr et al. (2025a) [preprint]

Attackers use AI too

Selected reports, 2025–2026, mostly from the AI companies themselves.

WHO DOES THE WORK

AI agents ran the attack

~80–90%

of the attack done by AI
[Anthropic-reported]
group GTG-1002, state-linked

NEW FLAWS

AI helped find an unknown flaw

zero-day

a flaw nobody knew: a way past two-step login (2FA)
Google's threat team believes AI was used

HOW CAPABLE

Open models catch up

50

GLM-5.3
open model

56

Mythos Preview
restricted


working Chrome attacks written, out of 410 tries, in Anthropic's own test

> Defenders use AI to find bugs; attackers can use it to exploit them.

Anthropic (2025a) [industry] · Anthropic (2025b) [industry] · Anthropic (September 2026) [industry] · GTIG (11 May 2026) [industry] · Anthropic (29 September 2026) [industry]

CVE disclosures doubled from January to August 2026

CVE (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures) = a public ID for one known software flaw.




Few published CVEs are ever exploited, but that number is growing too.

CVEs seen exploited, monthly average · all of 2025 vs January–August 2026



GTIG (30 September 2026) [industry]

AI helped find Firefox bugs



22 CVE records filed

14 of them high severity

≈ **20%** of Firefox's 2025 high-severity fixes


Mozilla and Anthropic, 6 March 2026 · confirmed flaws fixed in Firefox 148. Not the April "181 exploits" claim on slide 59: different model, date and unit.

Evidence of **discovery and remediation**, not of AI-created flaws.

Mozilla (6 March 2026) [industry] · Anthropic (6 March 2026) [industry]

Does AI explain the whole CVE increase?

Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) · CVEs per month, 2026




To measure the AI share: a note on each CVE, did AI help? · when old backlogs were cleared

The count alone cannot tell how much is due to **AI**. The bar widths are guesses, not measured.

FIRST (15 June 2026) · GTIG (30 September 2026) [industry]

A draft is not an authorisation

A hidden instruction in a ticket (prompt injection)



A **permission check outside the AI** blocks the action: a draft is not an order.

Greshake et al. (2023) · NIST AI 100-2e2025 · Parasuraman & Manzey (2010).

Predict · which phishing emails get clicked?

Heiding et al. (2024) · 101 people, four kinds of phishing email


Example lure · written for this course

From: Meetup team <events@exampIe.com>

Subject: Your question at last week's talk

Hi, we liked your question on LLM agents. Could you add a short summary before Friday?

Add your summary →




AI-written phishing works **as well as experts'**, several times better than a generic email (small groups).

Predict · does the agent need the CVE text?

CVE-2024-21626 **8.6 high** **runc** (the tool that starts containers): a leaked file handle lets a program escape its container.

one of the 15 · the public description is what the agent gets



The description does most of the work: **13 → 1**. Other AIs and standard scanners: **0 of 15**.

Research demonstration; the incidents that follow are a different evidence category.

Fang et al. (2024) [preprint]

The Hugging Face breach

July 2026 · AI agents under test break out, one wall at a time

▣ **The test** · AI agents try hacking tasks, each run locked in a sandbox, scored automatically

1 × **Got out to the internet** · through a package server meant for downloads only

2 × **Talked to each other** · about 700 of ~1,200 runs shared messages to trick the scoring program

3 × **Got into Hugging Face** · leaked access keys and a dataset with hidden code let them run code

4 × **Spread inside** · from one server into several internal systems over a weekend

Outcome

Internal data and access keys taken.

METR (independent AI testers): nothing useful found about the scorer.


Each wall was a rule outside the AI. Each one failed.

> How it was caught: Hugging Face's LLM-based triage of security logs flagged the compromise.

Hugging Face (16 July 2026) [industry] · METR / Redwood (26 August 2026, preliminary) · OpenAI (26 August 2026) [industry]

The Medicare portal block

An OpenAI agent was blocked from a government portal, then tried other routes until it got in.



Government account, 24 September 2026. Axis in days from 18 June; only the three dots are dated.

Data impact: public and non-public files; no personal information believed accessed.

> **Lesson:** when an agent is blocked, it must stop, not look for another way in.

Forecasts are claims to test

Government cyber agencies forecast that AI will make attacks worse. How could we check?

UK CYBER AGENCY (NCSC) · JAN 2024 · FOR 2025

“almost certainly increase the volume and heighten the impact” of cyber attacks

UK CYBER AGENCY (NCSC) · MAY 2025 · FOR 2027

“almost certainly … a digital divide” between systems that keep pace and the rest

> **Check:** what would we count, compared with what, to see whether attacks really became more frequent and more harmful?

NCSC (2024) [government] · NCSC (2025) [government]

Vote · which defence stops which attack?

A **The phishing email** (alert 1): a fake login page at `mail.exampIe.com` asks for your password.

B **A fake video call** (Arup, 2024): a deepfake "manager" asks staff to approve a payment.

Hands up: does each defence stop A, B, or neither?

Spot bad grammar

Weak against A. AI writes fluent, personal text.

Confirm on a video call

Weak against B. At Arup the video call itself was fake.

Call back on a number you already know

Stops B, if the number comes from our own directory.

Passkeys instead of passwords

Stops A. A passkey only works on the real site, so the fake page gets nothing.

Where do evaluations and AI tools mislead? Leaky tests and drift. LLM text is a draft: check it, limit it.

No defence guarantees prevention. Arup case: CNN (2024) [news].

Further reading

Two papers to read next, and labs to try on the course page.

READ · ABOUT 30 MIN

Why security ML scores mislead

Arp et al. (2022), *Dos and Don'ts of Machine Learning in Computer Security*. Read the introduction and the ten pitfalls.

Today: slides 50–55, four ways a score can mislead.

Ask: which pitfall would change your view of a vendor's claim?

READ · ABOUT 25 MIN

How attackers target AI

NIST AI 100-2e2025, *Adversarial Machine Learning*. Read sections 1–2.

Today: slides 65 and 68, the hidden instruction and the Hugging Face breach.

Ask: what can the attacker know, and what can they change?

Try it yourself **Lab 01** train a login-alert model · **Lab 03** build a phishing detector · **Lab 04** investigate unusual traffic · **Lab 05** the analyst queue · **Lab 09** expose evaluation leakage · **Lab 11** a file detector's blind spots

Optional depth (base rates, time splits, prompt injection): reading guide. Slides and handouts shared after class.

Evidence first, then action

email `mail.exampIe.com/reset`	as a QR code, the lure scored only 0.12	**it sees only what we encode**
attack path `host → backup server`	one extra sensor blocked the best route	**rewards shape what agents learn**
sign-in `02:14 · new laptop`	flagged, but a planned laptop swap	**rare attacks: most alerts are false**
traffic `95 MB/min → 203.0.113.45`	huge for ws-114, normal for a backup server	**normal depends on the host**
file `invoice_7731.pdf.exe`	no single clue decided alone	**combine evidence before acting**

How does a model learn from data? From labels, patterns, hidden parts or rewards, on our features.
Is the detector useful? Only if enough alerts are real for analysts to keep up.
Where do evaluations and AI tools mislead? Leaky tests and drift. LLM text is a draft: check it, limit it.

> When does an AI output justify action? When the **evidence is checked** and someone is **allowed** to act: a score tested on our own traffic; LLM text confirmed by other sources.

Back matter · 2026 sources on vulnerability discovery

- Mozilla [industry]: Hardening Firefox with Anthropic’s Red Team, 6 March.
- Anthropic [industry]: Partnering with Mozilla to improve Firefox’s security, 6 March.
- Cloud Security Alliance: Research note on the AI vulnerability-scanning market, 8 March.
- Anthropic [industry]: Claude Mythos Preview and its cyber capabilities, 7 April.
- UK AI Security Institute [government]: Evaluation of Claude Mythos Preview’s cyber capabilities, 13 April.
- Epoch AI: Whether Mythos’ cyber capabilities are overhyped, 11 June.
- FIRST: Mid-year vulnerability forecast, 15 June. Forecast values are not final annual counts.
- Anthropic [industry]: GLM-5.3 and the spread of advanced cyber capabilities, 29 September.
- Google Threat Intelligence Group [industry]: Vulnerability discovery and exploitation trends in the AI era, 30 September.

Primary sources checked 1–2 November 2026. Case reports and industry analyses; not population-wide causal estimates.

Back matter · 2026 sources on agent incidents

- UK AI Security Institute [government]: Evaluation of OpenAI's GPT-5.5 cyber capabilities, 30 April.
- Google Threat Intelligence Group [industry]: AI-assisted vulnerability exploitation for initial access, 11 May.
- Hugging Face Security Team [industry]: July incident disclosure, 16 July.
- OpenAI [industry]: The Hugging Face incident and the road ahead, 26 August.
- METR and Redwood Research: Independent investigation of agent behaviour, 26 August; bounded review scope.
- Australian Prime Minister [government]: Public statement on the Medicare portal incident, 24 September.
- Australian Institute of Health and Welfare [government]: Separate site-impact clarification, 25 September.
- Anthropic [industry]: Threat intelligence report, September.

Primary sources checked 1–2 November 2026. Case reports and industry analyses; not population-wide causal estimates.

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Appendix A · Discovery is not a guarantee

RESEARCH / INDUSTRY DEMONSTRATION

Big Sleep

Project Zero and DeepMind reported an exploitable SQLite finding in 2024.
Check: the reproduced bug and affected version.

CHALLENGE SETTING

AI Cyber Challenge

DARPA reported systems finding and patching vulnerabilities in the challenge.
Check: patch correctness and behaviour outside the challenge.

> Discovery results support a bounded capability claim; they do not establish general SOC reliability.

Google Project Zero & Google DeepMind (2024) [industry] · DARPA (2025) [government].

Appendix B · Terms and source labels

Terms as used in these lectures

Model	A learned function that produces predictions, scores or generated content.
ML detector	Features + model + decision policy, often a threshold, used to raise alerts.
AI system	The model with its software, data and people.
Assistant	A language-model application that only proposes.
Agent	A language-model application that acts through tools.

Reading the source labels

[preprint]	Not yet peer-reviewed.
[industry]	Self-reported by a company.
[news]	A press report.
[government]	Published by a public authority.
Unlabelled	Peer-reviewed, non-profit or independent analysis.

Standards and law express normative requirements.
Performance claims still need empirical evidence.

Full acronym and working-term guide